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THE AIRCRAFT MANUFACTURER'S LIABILITY
FOR DESIGN AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES
THE INSURANCE POLICY AND
THE PUBLIC POLICY
DONALD M. HASKELL*
T HE DRASTIC changes that the law in product liability litiga-
tion has undergone in recent years1 appear to be geared
philosophically toward those same social concepts that have per-
meated other areas of American life, beginning many years ago
with the development of the idea of society's general responsibility
to individuals rather than that of individual self-reliance. Under
our common-law system, courts continue to reflect present day
social thinking that the financial burdens of personal catastrophes
should be borne by those who society, rightly or wrongly, believes
can better bear the loss; and, as a result, all manufacturers today
continue to face increasing exposure to legal liability for accidents
involving their products.
Although the exposure of products liability' is nothing new to
* University of Michigan, J.D. Attorney-at-law in Chicago, Illinois.
The rapid expansion of product liability law in recent years is exhaustively
discussed in Comment, Products Liability - The Expansion of Fraud, Negligence,
and Strict Tort Liability, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1350 (1966). See also Keeton, Prod-
ucts Liability-Some Observations About Allocation of Risks, 64 MICH. L.
REV. 1329 (1966); Noel, Manufacturer's Negligence of Design or Directions for
Use of a Product, 71 YALE L.J. 816 (1962); Noel, Strict Liability of Manufac-
turers, 50 A.B.A.J. 446 (1964); Noel, Recent Trends in Manufacturer's Negli-
gence as to Design, Instruction or Warning, 19 Sw. L.J. 93 (1965); Prosser, The
Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099
(1960); Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50
MINN. L. REV. 791 (1966); Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective
Products and Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. REV. 363 (1965); Wade, Strict Tort
Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5 (1965).
2 An aircraft manufacturer is subject to essentially the same legal duties as
is a manufacturer of any other product. See, e.g., North American Aviation, Inc.
v. Hughes, 247 F.2d 517 (9th Cir. 1957); Carter Carburetor Corp. v. Riley,
186 F.2d 148 (8th Cir. 1951); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Glenn L. Martin Co.,
224 F.2d 120 (6th Cir. 1955); Boeing Airplane Co. v. Brown, 291 F.2d 310 (9th
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Cir. 1961). See generally McCoy, Manufacturer's Responsibility, 34 J. AIR L.
& COM. 489 (1968); Murray, Aircraft Manufacturers' and Overhaulers' Liability
for Defects in Construction, Design and Overhaul-The Extension of the Mac-
Pherson v. Buick Rule From the Terrestrial to the Celestial, 13 U. MIAMI L.
REv. 189 (1958); 1 L. KRIENDLER, AVIATION ACCIDENT LAW ch. 7, S 7.02
(rev. ed. 1972).
Liability can arise under a theory of negligence. See American Airways, Inc.
v. Ford Motor Co., 170 Misc. 721, 10 N.Y.S.2d 816 (1939); Starkey v. Miami
Aviation Corp., 214 So. 2d 738 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968); Bell Aerospace v.
Anderson, 478 S.W.2d 191 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972); Continental Motors Corp. v.
Joly, 483 P.2d 244 (Wyo. 1971); Manos v. TWA, 324 F. Supp. 470 (N.D. Ill.
1971); Boeing Airplane Co. v. Brown, 291 F.2d 310 (9th Cir. 1961). Liability
can also arise from breach of express warranty; see Burr v. Sherwin Williams
Co., 42 Cal. 2d 682, 268 P.2d 1041 (1954); Mannsz v. Macwhyte Co., 155 F.2d
445 (3d Cir. 1946); Banko v. Continental Motors, 373 F.2d 314 (4th Cir. 1966).
See generally L. FRUMER & M. FREIDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 16.04(4)
(1968). For breach of implied warranty, see Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors,
32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960); King v. Douglas Aircraft, 159 So. 2d 108
(Fla. App. 1964); Weinstein v. Eastern Airlines, 316 F.2d 758 (3d Cir. 1963);
Holcomb v. Cessna, 439 F.2d li50 (5th Cir. 1971); Krause v. Sud-Aviation,
301 F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). In most states, liability can also arise under
the doctrine of strict liability in tort.
STATES PRESENTLY ADHERING TO THE DOCTRINE OF
STRICT LIABILITY:
ALASKA: Clary v. Fifth Avenue Chrysler Center, Inc., 454 P.2d 244 (1969);
Bachner v. Pearson, 479 P.2d 319 (1970). ARIZONA: Maas v. Dreher, 10 Ariz.
App. 520, 460 P.2d 191 (1969); Caruth v. Mariani, 11 Ariz. App. 188, 463 P.2d
83 (1970); Hardy v. Hull Corp., 446 F.2d 34 (9th Cir. 1971). CALIFORNIA:
Barth v. B.F. Goodrich Tire Co., 265 Cal. App. 2d 228, 71 Cal. Rptr. 306
(1968); Casetta v. United States Rubber Co., 260 Cal. App. 2d 792, 67 Cal.
Rptr. 645 (1968); Elmore v. American Motors Corp., 70 Cal. 2d 578, 451 P.2d
84, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1969); Price v. Shell Oil Co., 2 Cal. 3d 245, 466 P.2d
722, 85 Cal. Rptr. 178 (1970); Pike v. Frank G. Hough, 2 Cal. 3d 465, 467
P.2d 229, 85 Cal. Rptr. 629 (1970); Luque v. McLean, 8 Cal. 3d 136, 501 P.2d
1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 443 (1972); Cronin v. J.B.E. Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501
P.2d 1163, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972). CONNECTICUT: De Felice v. Ford
Motor Co., 28 Conn. Supp. .164, 255 A.2d 636 (1969); Guglielmo v. Cooper,
130 Conn. 308, 259 A.2d 608 (1969); Whitfield v. Cooper, 30 Conn. Supp. 47,
298 A.2d 50 (1972). DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA: Cottom v. McGuire Funeral
Serv., Inc., 262 A.2d 807 (D.C. Ct. App. 1970). HAWAII: Stewart v. Budget
Rent-A-Car Corp., 52 Hawaii 71, 470 P.2d 240 (1970). ILLINOIS: Winnett
v. Winnett, 9 Ill. App. 3d 644, 292 N.E.2d 524 (1973); Williams v. Brown Mfg.
Co., 45 II. 2d 418, 261 N.E.2d 305 (1970). INDIANA: Cornette v. Searjeant
Metal Prods., Inc., 147 Ind. App. 46, 258 N.E.2d 652 (1970). IOWA: Hawkeye-
Security Ins. v. Ford Motor Co., 174 N.W.2d 672 (Iowa 1970); Hawkeye-
Security Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 199 N.W.2d 373 (Iowa 1972). KEN-
TUCKY: Dealers Transp. Co. v. Battery Distribut. Co., 402 S.W.2d 441 (Ky.
1966); Penker Constr. Co. v. Finley, 485 S.W.2d 244 (Ky. App. 1972). LOU-
ISIANA: Soileau v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 302 F. Supp. 119 (W.D. La. 1969);
Gauthier v. Sperry Rand, Inc., 252 So. 2d 129 (La. App. 1971); cert. denied,
259 La. 940, 353 So. 2d 382 (1971). MINNESOTA: Kerr v. Corning Glass
Works, 284 Minn. 115, 169 N.W.2d 587 (1969); Waite v. American Creosote
Works, Inc., 295 Minn. 288, 204 N.W.2d 410 (1973). MISSISSIPPI: Pridgett v.
Jackson Iron & Metal Co., 253 So. 2d 837 (Miss. 1971); Sam Shainberg Co.
v. Barlow, 258 So. 2d 242 (1972). MISSOURI: Keener. v. Dayton Elec. Mfg.
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Co., 445 S.W.2d 362 (Mo. 1969). MONTANA: Brandenburger v. Toyota Motor
Sales, U.S.A., Inc., CCH PRODS. LIAR. REP. 5 7009 (Mont. 1973). See Hornung
v. Richardson-Merrill, Inc., 317 F. Supp. 183 (D. Mont. 1970). NEBRASKA:
Kohler v. Ford Motor Co., 187 Neb. 428, 191 N.W.2d 601 (1971). NEVADA:
Ginnis v. Mapes Hotel Corp., 86 Nev. 408, 470 P.2d 135 (1970); General Elec.
Co. v. Bush, 498 P.2d 366 (Nev. 1972). NEW HAMPSHIRE: Elliott v. La-
chance, 109 N.H. 48, 256 A.2d 153 (1969); Buttrick v. Arthur Lessard & Sons,
Inc., 110 N.H. 36, 260 A.2d 111 (1969); McLaughlin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
111 N.H. 265, 281 A.2d 587 (1971). NEW JERSEY: Bexiga v. Havir Mfg.
Corp. 60 N.J. 402, 290 A.2d 281 (1972); Devaney v. Sarno, 122 N.J. Super. 99,
299 A.2d 95 (1973). NEW MEXICO: Stang v. Hertz Corp., 83 N.M. 730, 497
P.2d 732 (1972). NEW YORK: Singer v. Walker, 39 App. Div. 2d 90, 331
N.Y.S.2d 823 (1972); Codling v. Paglia, 38 App. Div. 2d 154, 327 N.Y.S.2d
978 (1972); Paglia v. Chrysler Corp., CCH PRODS. LIAB. REP. 5 6979 (N.Y.
1973). OHIO: Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corp., 6 Ohio St. 2d 227, 218 N.E.2d
185 (1967): The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed a lower court opinion holding
that action in tort for injury to personal property due to a defective product
can be maintained for breach of implied warranty. Privity is not necessary.
However, authorities cite Lonzrick as indicating Ohio courts follows the RE-
STATEMENT OF TORTS § 402A. See 24 WEST'S GENERAL DIGEST, Products Liabil-
ity § 5 (1973); Buckhard v. Short, 28 Ohio App. 2d 141, 275 N.E.2d 632
(1971); Mahalsky v. The Salem Tool Co., 461 F.2d 581 (6th Cir. 1972).
OKLAHOMA: Marshall v. Ford Motor Co., 446 F.2d 712 (10th Cir. 1971);
Vaughn v. Chrysler Corp., 442 F.2d 619 (10th Cir. 1971). See Marathon Bat-
tery Co. v. Kilpatrick, CCH PRODS. LIAB. REP. 5 5501 (Okla. 1965); see also
Speed Fasterners, Inc. v. Newsom, 382 F.2d 395 (10th Cir. 1967). OREGON:
Oregon adopted § 402A in the case of Heaton v. Ford Motor Co., 248 Ore.
467, 435 P.2d 806 (1967); Anderson v. Klix Chem. Co., 256 Ore. 199, 472
P.2d 806 (1970); Cornelius v. Bay Motors, Inc., 258 Ore. 564, 484 P.2d 299
(1971). PENNSYLVANIA: Pennsylvania adopted § 402A as its common law
in Webb v. Zern, 422 Pa. 424, 220 A.2d 853 (1966); Burchil v. Kearney Nat'l
Corp., 468 F.2d 384 (2d Cir. 1972). RHODE ISLAND: Ritter v. Narraganset
Elec. Co. v. American Motors Corp., 109 R.I. 176, 283 A.2d 255 (1971). See
Oresman v. G. C. Searle & Co., 321 F. Supp. 449 (D.R.I. 1971). SOUTH DA-
KOTA: Engberg v. Ford Motor Co., 205 N.W.2d 104 (S.D. 1973). TENNES-
SEE: Hargrove v. W. L. Newsome & Kelley Co., 225 Tenn. 462, 470 S.W.2d
348 (1971); Walker v. Decora, Inc., 225 Tenn. 504, 471 S.W.2d 778 (1971).
TEXAS: McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. 1967); Daryl
v. Ford Motor Co., 440 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. 1969); Bass v. General Motors Corp.,
491 S.W.2d 941 (Tex. 1973). VERMONT: Wasik v. Borg, 423 F.2d 44 (2d Cir.
1970). Though recognizing that the Vermont state courts have not fully adopted
§ 402A of the Restatement the Wasik court anticipates that the rule of strict
liability will be applied in Vermont. This conclusion is supported by Deveny v.
Rheem Mfg. Co., 319 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1963). Two years after Deveny, the
Supreme Court of Vermont decided that the privity requirement between the
consumer of defective food and the processor was not required to maintain a
cause of action. O'Brien v. Comstock Foods, Inc., 125 Vt. 158, 212 A.2d 69
(1965). In the O'Brien case, the court stated it is "not restrained by any pre-
cedent in this jurisdiction where the requirement of privity has been applied to
products liability. We must find the applicable law as it has developed and
grown in other jurisdictions." Id. at -, 212 A.2d at 71. WASHINGTON: Ulmer
v. Ford Motor Co., 75 Wash. 2d 522, 452 P.2d 729 (1969); Palmer v. Massey-
Ferguson, Inc., 3 Wash. App. 508, 476 P.2d 713 (1970). WISCONSIN: Howes
v. Hansen, 56 Wis. 2d 247, 201 N.W.2d 825 (1972); City of Franklin v. Badger
Ford Truck Sales, Inc., CCH PRODS. LIAR. REP. 5 6996 (Wis. 1973).
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STATES NOT PRESENTLY ADHERING TO THE DOCTRINE OF
STRICT LIABILITY:
ALABAMA: Opelika Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Johnson, 5 Div. 12, 46 Ala.
App. 298, 241 So. 2d 327 (1970); Remington Arms Co., Inc. v. Wilkins, 387
F.2d 48 (5th Cir. 1967). See also Collins Baking Co. v. Savage, 227 Ala. 408,
150 So. 2d 336 (1933). ARKANSAS: Flippo v. Mode O'Day Frock Shops, 248
Ark. 1, 449 S.W.2d 692 (1970). DELAWARE: Moore v. Douglas Aircraft Co.,
282 A.2d 625 (Del. 1971); Handy v. Uniroyal, Inc., 327 F. Supp. 596 (D. Del.
1971). See also Kates v. Pepsi Cola Bottling Co., 263 A.2d 308 (Del. Super.
1970). GEORGIA: Whittaker v. Harvell-Kilgore Corp., 418 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir.
1969); McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Tate, 124 Ga. App. 605, 184 S.E.2d
834 (1971). IDAHO: Robinson v. Williamsen Idaho Equip. Co., 94 Idaho 819,
498 P.2d 1292 (1972). See also Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 399 F.2d
121 (9th Cir. 1968). KANSAS: Garst v. General Motors Corp., 207 Kan. 2, 484
P.2d 47 (1971) (case does not speak of strict liability at all, only negligence);
Butterfield v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 210 Kan. 123, 499 P.2d 539 (1972).
MAINE: To maintain an action in negligence where the injury occurred from
using a product, privity must be established. However, Maine courts dispense
with the privity requirement in cases involving injuries caused by inherently
dangerous products and unwholesome food products. Pelletier v. DuPont, 124
Me. 269, 128 A. 186 (1925); Flaherty v. Helfont, 123 Me. 134, 122 A. 180
(1923). The Maine courts also require privity in breach of warranty cases.
MARYLAND: Upgren v. Executive Aviation Servs., 326 F. Supp. 709 (D. Md.
1971); Bona v. Graefe, 264 Md. 69, 285 A.2d 607 (1972). MASSACHUSETTS:
Kenny v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 355 Mass. 604, 246 N.E.2d 649 (1969); Mc-
Laughlin v. Bernstein, 356 Mass. 219, 249 N.E.2d 17 (1969). NORTH CARO-
LINA: Byrd v. Star Rubber Co., 11 N.C. App. 297, 181 S.E.2d 227 (1971);
Home Mut. Ins. Co. v. Vick, 17 N.C. App. 106, 193 S.E.2d 322 (1972), cert.
denied, 282 N.C. 582, 194 S.E.2d 151 (1973). NORTH DAKOTA: Christensen
v. Osakis Silo Co., 424 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1970). UTAH: Utah requires privity
between the manufacturer or seller and the injured plaintiff in suits based both
upon a warranty and upon a negligence theory, although Utah recognizes the
imminently and inherently dangerous product exceptions to the privity require-
ment. Hewitt v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 3 Utah 2d 354, 284 P.2d 471
(1955); Schneider v. Suhrmann, 8 Utah 2d 35, 327 P.2d 822 (1958). VIRGI-
NIA: Hempstead v. General Fire Extinguisher Corp., 269 F. Supp. 109 (D. Del.
1967) (applying Virginia law); Chestnut v. Ford Motor Co., 445 F.2d 967
(4th Cir. 1971). WEST VIRGINIA: West Virginia requires privity between one
seeking recovery for a product-caused injury on the ground of negligence and
the manufacturer or seller in the absence of one of the recognized exceptions
to the privity rule. Roush v. Johnson, 139 W. Va. 607, 80 S.E.2d 857 (1954);
Webb v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 121 W. Va. 115, 2 S.E.2d 898
(1939); Burgess v. Sanitary Meat Market, 121 W. Va. 605, 5 S.E. 785 (1939).
West Virginia courts have not mentioned the strict liability doctrine, and one
case questioned the existence of the standard exceptions to the privity require-
ments in negligence actions in that state. See Williams v. Chrysler Corp., 148
W. Va. 655, 137 S.E.2d 225 (1964). WYOMING: There is a paucity of product
liability cases in this jurisdiction. However, one case indicates that Wyoming
has adopted the inherently dangerous product exception to the privity require-
ment, and requires priviy between an injured party and a manufacturer in cases
based upon theories of either warranty or negligence. Parker v. Heaslor Plumbing
& Heating Co., 388 P.2d 516 (Wyo. 1964).
STATES UNDECIDED OR UNCLEAR ON STRICT LIABILITY:
COLORADO: Newton v. Admiral Corp., 280 F. Supp. 202 (D. Colo. 1967).
Under Colorado law, the manufacturer, wholesaler, and retail dealer or distri-
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the aircraft manufacturer, what is new is the increasing financial
burden resulting from the vast expansion in recent years of pro-
ducts liability theories. The defense of aircraft manufacturers in
products litigation thus requires not only a thorough understanding
of current legal considerations, but also requires some insight into
possible future changes in the law. A vigilant and vigorous defense
effort to challenge the ever-expanding legal theories being advanced
butor of a product warrants that the product is free from defects which render
the product unreasonably dangerous to the user or his property. Schenfled v.
Norton Co., 391 F.2d 420 (10th Cir. 1968). Since there has been a paucity of
decisions on products liability in Colorado "we do not know [sic] but surmise
that Colorado will, in a proper case, embrace the concept of strict liability for
all defective products, either in the name of tort or warranty." Clay v. Ensign-
Bickford Co., 307 F. Supp. 288 (D. Colo. 1969), holding that Section 402(a)
of the Restatement implies a warranty by the seller that the product is free from
defects which render the product unreasonably dangerous to the user or his
property and that such rule applies to the manufacturer of the product, as well
as any retail dealer, distributor or wholesaler. FLORIDA: Royal v. Black &
Decker Mfg. Co., 205 So. 2d 307 (Fla Dist. Ct. App. 1968).
It is not in itself a breach of duty by manufacturer to supply
materials which are reasonably safe when customarily used, even
though material might conceivably be made more safe, nor must
the manufacturer make his product "more" safe when danger to
be avoided is obvious to all.
Id. at 310.
The primary concern is to protect the user from the unreason-
ably dangerous product or from one fraught with unexpected dan-
ger. Id. at 309 (emphasis in original).
E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. Jordan, 254 So. 2d 17 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971);
Lipsius v. Bristol-Meyers Co., 265 So. 2d 396 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972); E.R.
Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. Stickney, 274 So. 2d 898 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
MICHIGAN: Continental Cas. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 327 F. Supp.
720 (E.D. Mich. 1970).
Under Piercefield v. Remington Arms Co., 375 Mich. 85, 133 N.W.2d 129
(1965), a plaintiff must prove (a) the defect in the product of the manufac-
turer, and (b) that the injury or damage was caused by such defect.
The district court in Continental Casualty felt that Michigan courts, as per
Piercefield, have adopted the strict liability in tort doctrine, but under the guise
of the implied warranty theory.
A manufacturer in Michigan must be reasonable and prudent under all the
circumstances. With product design, a manufacturer must use reasonable and
ordinary care in planning or designing his product so that it is reasonably safe
for the purposes for which it was intended. Farr v. Wheeler Mfg. Corp., 24
Mich. App. 379, 180 N.E.2d 311 (1970).
A manufacturer in Michigan must exercise due care in safeguarding its
product against reasonably foreseeable risks to persons using that product in
the manner intended and reasonably foreseeably; a manufacturer must make
his products reasonably fit for their intended purpose; and it is the duty of a
manufacturer to use reasonable care under the circumstances to design his prod-
uct so as to make it safe for its intended use. This duty includes designing the
product so that it will meet any emergency or use which can be reasonably
anticipated. Grant v. National Acme Co., 351 F. Supp. 972 (W.D. Mich. 1972).
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in products cases is essential to insure the judicial restraint neces-
sary to equitably balance recovery for personal misfortunes with
needed technological and economic development under our free
enterprise system.
This article is intended to explore the liability of aircraft manu-
facturers in design defect cases, including the so-called "crash-
worthiness" doctrine; and to discuss the manufacturer's liability
for punitive damages, including the problems faced by them in
attempting to obtain insurance coverage for those forms of dam-
ages.
I. LIABILITY FOR DEFECTIVE DESIGN
A. Negligence vs. Strict Liability
The doctrine of strict liability in tort has, unfortunately, been
extended in a few jurisdictions to impose liability on a manufac-
turer for a design defect The courts in these jurisdictions have
accepted the argument that no compelling reason exists for dis-
tinguishing design from manufacturing defects, since either may
render the product equally dangerous. The extension of the strict-
liability-in-tort doctrine to include design defects is derived from
long-established precedent that holds the manufacturer liable for
negligence in designing its products. The basic elements of proof
in those few jurisdictions that permit strict liability for product
design, however, still remain the same as for strict liability for
manufacturing defects.'
In the remaining jurisdictions that have officially adopted the
strict-liability-in-torts doctrine, as enunciated in the Restatement
[of Torts], manufacturers can expect the consumer to continue to
advance the extension of that doctrine to include claimed design
defects. The usual arguments that are made to apply the strict
liability doctrine in design defect cases include: that ultimate costs
should be borne by the manufacturer because it created the risk
in the first place by placing the product on the market; that insur-
ance coverage is available to cover the loss, permitting the manu-
facturer to spread the expense of increased premiums to the public
by raising the price of its product; that the manufacturer is better
IPike v. Hough, 2 Cal. 3d 465, 467 P.2d 229 (1970); Wright v. Massey-
Harris, 68 Il. App. 2d 70, 215 N.E.2d 465 (1966).
4 Cases cited note 3 supra.
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able than the consumer to control any dangers created by a de-
fectively designed product; that the consumer relies on a manu-
facturer's representations; that the extension of the doctrine makes
it unnecessary to raise the privity of contract problems involved
in warranty actions; and that the plaintiff's burden of proof is
lessened, making it easier for an injured party to recover.'
Admittedly, the application of strict liability in tort in design
defect litigation makes it easier for a plaintiff to recover. However,
the aircraft manufacturer is presented with several very serious
problems if he can be found liable under the law in design defect
cases without any evidence of negligence.
The initial problem arises simply because an adverse judgment
for defective design can render the manufacturer's total output of
his product unmarketable. A manufacturing defect, on the other
hand, usually only affects the individual product in question, or at
most, a portion of the total output of a particular product. Those
courts which have permitted liability for design defects, without a
finding of negligence, have done so where the manufacturer fails
to supply needed safety devices in the product design; where be-
cause of the design there is a concealed danger; and where the
design employed by the manufacturer calls for material of inade-
quate strength.' If the application of the strict tort liability doctrine
in defect design cases is limited only to those actual situations that
clearly fall within the foregoing parameters, and is not allowed to
merge with those generally found in other manufacturing defect
cases, then the marketability of a manufacturer's entire product
line will be called into question only when it is clearly appropriate.
Secondly, any design engineer will concede that the design of
any product involves a series of compromises. If the cockpit win-
dows of an aircraft are enlarged to create better visibility, as one
simple example, the fuselage shell may be weakened, or other cock-
pit design problems, such as instrument visibility, would be created.
If the fuselage is then strengthened, the resultant weight gain and
decreased load-carrying capability or resultant instrument inacces-
sibility may then make the aircraft dangerous or unmarketable.
ISee Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 483, 150 P.2d 436 (1944)
(negligence rationale); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161
A.2d 69 (1960); Suvada v. White Motors Co., 32 IIl. 612, 210 N.E.2d 182
(1965). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402(a), comment.
' See cases cited not 3 supra.
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This is but one small example of the thousands of decisions and
judgments which any design engineer must make in the design of
any aircraft. To permit a lay jury to "second guess" all design deci-
sions years later in products litigation (without requiring any find-
ing of negligence in the design) results in an unwarranted expan-
sion of an aircraft manufacturer's liability.
Third, and probably the most perplexing problem of all, is the
extent to which a plaintiff will be permitted to challenge standard
design practices in those jurisdictions which have adopted the strict
liability in tort doctrine for design defects. If all design decisions
are subject years later to review on then existing standards, then a
manufacturer cannot realistically protect itself without impeding
meaningful technological development. This is an area where very
careful analysis and judicial restraint is essential to effectively and
equitably balance social concepts of recovery with desirable eco-
nomic and technological progress.
Other problems face an aircraft manufacturer by an expansion
of liability, without negligence, in the area of product design.
When a manufacturer fails to follow proper standards of design
practices-i.e., is negligent, the resultant liability for a defective
design is understandable and predictable; and the manufacturer
can achieve some measure of protection by constantly improving
his design methods and updating his knowledge. But when a manu-
facturer can be liable for a design defect without negligence, there
is no realistic way that it can protect itself. Since all design deci-
sions are based on compromises of one sort or another, three
different design experts can each have a different concept of the
design of an aircraft or one of its components-and each of the
three could believe that the design of the other two is wrong, even
though all three have followed the identical, known design stan-
dards which all three may agree are the proper ones, such as, for
example, a standard set forth by government regulation.
The aviation industry today is one of the most, if not the most,
government-regulated industries in the world. An analysis of the
Federal Aviation Act," which governs the design and manufacture
'Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301 et seq. (1970), formerly
Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 973 (1938). For the effect of certifica-
tion procedures, see Manos v. TWA, 324 F. Supp. 470 (N.D. Ill. 1971); Prash-
ker v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 258 F.2d 602 (3d Cir. 1958); De Vito v. United
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of aircraft, reveals quite explicit language in the requirements for
testing of the entire aircraft. All of the tests are intended to insure
the aircraft's reliability and safety. The certification by the United
States government is a very important part of the aircraft manu-
facturing process; the manufacturer is prohibited by law from sell-
ing, and the operator is prohibited by law from flying, an aircraft
not certificated by the government. Inasmuch as the entire process of
certification is such an integral part of the design and construction
of all aircraft, defense counsel must be thoroughly familiar with
all its ramifications and must continue to make use of these govern-
ment regulations and the arguments they suggest in defending de-
sign defect litigation.
Liability for negligent design is now fairly well established in
products cases. However, particularly since aircraft manufacturers
are already heavily regulated by the government, manufacturer's
liability for defective design, even under negligence theories, should
be based only upon legislative and regulative standards, and not
upon the unpredictable morass of standards that result from case-
by-case litigation of design problems. Liability for a design defect
under strict liability, without any evidence of negligence of the
aircraft manufacturer, only penalizes technological innovation and
encourages the imposition at the time of verdict of design criteria
generally not recognized at the time the aircraft was manufactured.
B. Crashworthiness: a Legislative, not a Judicial Function
With ever-increasing frequency, the proposition is being ad-
vanced that an aircraft manufacturer not only must design a "safe"
aircraft to fly, but also must design a "safe" aircraft to crash. The
leading case in this area of products liability law is the 1966 deci-
sion in Evans v. General Motors Corp.,8 in which the plaintiff
advanced the theory that General Motors was liable because it
manufactured an automobile that was unsafe for its occupants
when it was involved in a collision. The Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals in Evans agreed with the trial judge, who had granted de-
fendant's motion for summary judgment, that such an action could
Air Lines, Inc., 98 F. Supp. 88 (E.D.N.Y. 1951); Rapp v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc.,
399 F.2d 14 (3d Cir. 1968).
' 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1966).
19741
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
not be maintained, and held that a manufacturer is not under a
duty to make his vehicle:
... accident-proof or fool-proof; nor must he render the vehicle
more safe when the danger to be avoided is obvious to all.'
Although General Motors in Evans conceded that it had a duty to
design automobiles that were reasonably fit for the purpose for
which they were intended and had no latent defects, the court
clearly held that the intended purpose of a motor vehicle:
does not include its participation in collisions with other objects,
despite the manufacturer's ability to foresee the possibility that
such collisions may occur. As defendant argues, the defendant of-
ten knows that its automobiles may be driven into bodies of water,
but it is not suggested that defendant has the duty to equip them
with pontoons."
Similarly, aircraft may be flown by pilots who attempt to land on
bodies of water, even though the aircraft has wheels as landing
gears, but it has not been suggested that all aircraft must therefore
be equipped with pontoons or floats. Aircraft also can be expected
to collide with trees and buildings or impact with the ground, but
it is clearly unjust to require an aircraft manufacturer to provide
an aircraft "safe" for passengers in such a collision as an intended
use of the aircraft. Indeed, as the Evans court stated:
Perhaps it would be desirable to require manufacturers to construct
automobiles in which it would be safe to collide, but that would
be a legislative function, not an aspect of judicial interpretations
of existing law.1
It should also be kept in mind that the issue as to the legal duty
owed by an aircraft manufacturer to provide a "crashworthy" air-
craft is an issue of law for the court, and not one for the jury."
In products liability litigation that involves crashworthy issues,
the following basic reasons appear to underlie court decisions that
I Id. at 824.
'Id. at 825.
"Id. at 824.
"Both Evans v. General Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1966), and
the minority view of Larsen v. General Motors, 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968),
agree that the question of duty in design is a question of law for the Court.
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have held that no legal duty exists" on the part of the manufacturer
to provide a crashworthy product:
1. A manufacturer should not be required to make an acci-
dent-proof product.
2. A manufacturer should not be required to make a vehicle
"crashproof" where the danger to be avoided (i.e.,
crashes) is obvious to everyone.
3. "Crashworthy" design criteria are legislative and not ju-
dicial functions.
4. The normal and intended use of an aircraft does not in-
clude its participation in a crash.
5. The manufacturer of aircraft should not be an insurer of
all liability.
6. Juries are not the proper arbiters of design issues that do
not involve crash causation.
7. Sensible public policy prohibits the retrospective imposi-
tion of such a duty.
8. Any legal duty to eliminate injuries and deaths in crashes
would be impractical because of the myriad number and
variety of types of aircraft accidents.
9. No legal duty exists on the part of a manufacturer to
adopt every conceivable safety device.
10. Crashworthy claims invariably do not involve defects
which proximately caused the accident.
The mere fact that everyone knows that aircraft sometimes crash
does not mean that liability is co-extensive with foreseeability.
Foreseeability is only one limited factor in determining whether a
manufacturer has a legal duty. The principle that "liability" or
"duty" is distinct from foreseeability has clearly been recognized
by courts throughout the country. Foreseeability alone as a basis
for legal duty has been rejected, and rightfully so, as applied to
the so-called "crashworthiness" theory. There are many other ele-
"See Hoenig & Werber, Automobile "Crashworthiness": An Untenable Doc-
trine, 20 CLEV. L. REV. 578 (1971). This excellent article collects cases from
throughout the country, effectively distinguishes the minority view of cases such
as Larsen v. General Motors, 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968), and should be read
by all defense counsel involved in 'aircraft "crashworthiness" cases. For another
view, see Roda, Products Liability-The "Enhanced Injury Case" Revisited, 8
THE FORUM 643 (1973).
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ments, in addition to foreseeability, that are necessary to create a
legal duty. If foreseeability were the sole test of a legal duty, then
any person cut by a knife would have an action against the knife
manufacturer; any person falling from skiis, a bicycle, or roller
skates, or injured while riding a motorcycle, would have recourse
against the respective manufacturer.
As far as aircraft are concerned, there can be an almost un-
limited variety of front-end, rear-end, sideward, low-speed and
high-speed accidents. It is "foreseeable" that there will be colli-
sions with other aircraft, buildings or trees. It is "foreseeable" that
a fire may occur in any aircraft crash. It is certainly "foreseeable"
that an aircraft will impact with the ground in a crash. Design
decisions taken to avoid the consequences of some of these types
of accidents necessarily will aggravate the consequences in other
types of accidents. Nearly every accident situation, no matter how
bizarre, is "foreseeable" if only because pilots seem to be able to
discover every conceivable way of getting into trouble. At least the
obligation that the courts now recognize in imposing the duty to
manufacture an aircraft reasonably fit for the purpose for which
it is intended'4--- i.e., the transportation of person and property-is
a somewhat objective standard. The aircraft manufacturer at least
has some idea what he is required to do, albeit a jury may "second
guess" it as to whether it has succeeded. On the other hand, the
legal duty that proponents of the "crashworthiness" theory seek to
impose-i.e., to build an aircraft that is "safe" or "reasonably safe"
in a crash-does nothing but invite the jury to speculate retro-
spectively about what "safety" in a crash means.
The word "safe" when applied to accidents is a completely
vague term and is without real meaning. How safe is "safe"? In
collisions with what? Safe from impact? Safe from fire? At what
speeds? What priorities should be stressed in terms of the various
factors which affect the safety of any aircraft: sound structure,
visibility, speed, economy, handling quality, maneuverability, or
something else? In actual practice if such a legal duty existed, the
court or jury would necessarily have to fix the standard that the
case before it presents, and then determine whether the aircraft
as designed met this newly found criteria.
Without a legal standard fixed objectively, a manufacturer can-
14 See cases cited note 62 infra.
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not ascertain what he must do to satisfy his responsibility under
the law. Questions of this character are not appropriate for deci-
sion by a court or jury. Legislatures are much better equipped to
evaluate the pertinent safety considerations to protect the con-
sumer and to lay down the objective standards for prospective
application. Any verdict which operates only retrospectively can-
not do so. Focusing upon the specific accident before it, any plain-
tiff's verdict in such a case will be based solely on the hindsight
an expert in the particular circumstance may believe to have been,
in his opinion, "safer." Although a plaintiff in a particular law-
suit may benefit, the interest of the general public can better be
served through appropriate legislation that sets forth clear criteria
for the manufacturer. As pointed out by one proponent of auto
safety:
Judicially enforced reform would of necessity be episodic and dis-
organized, dependent upon the fortuitous circumstances of indi-
vidual lawsuits .... the imposition of safety standards on the auto-
mobile industry, can most likely be achieved better by a consistent
application of regulatory standards drawn up by experts and kept
current by research, rather than by ad hoc decisions of inexpert
judges and juries."5
Only a legislature can most effectively balance conflicting public
interests in deciding objectively what should be properly sacrificed
in terms of consumer values, and what should not be done in those
interests in the manufacture of a "completely safe" aircraft when
involved in a crash. The many and complex technical questions
involved in designing aircraft to minimize injuries and fatalities in
the great variety of aircraft accidents can be more effectively dealt
with by objective legislative and administrative action. An invita-
tion to a court or jury to decide problems of design that are not
related to accident causation is only an invitation to substitute
hindsight, inconsistency, sympathy, and speculation in place of the
overall balancing in the public interest of the social and economic
questions involved in all aircraft design.
It is for these reasons that the majority of the courts that have
decided this issue have properly held that the imposition of a legal
duty advocated by proponents of the so-called "crashworthiness
15O'Connell, Taming the Automobile, 58 Nw. U.L. REv. 299, 375 (1963).
The same rationale applies to aircraft.
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doctrine" must be created by the legislature, and not by the courts.
The great weight of authority therefore rejects as a matter of law
the contention that a manufacturer, absent legislation, is liable for
crash consequences when the accident was not caused by any de-
fect in the product." The majority view is also entirely consistent
with the strict-liability-in-tort doctrine. All aircraft clearly involve
some risk of harm to occupants when involved in crashes. This,
alone, does not make them either unreasonably dangerous or de-
fective. The few decisions to the contrary are based upon a ration-
ally untenable test of "foreseeability." Federal legislation and ad-
ministrative procedures today continue to move forthrightly into
this entire problem area with massive funds, research, and tech-
nological expertise, which is really the best and most sensible
approach in the public interest.
II. PUNITIVE DAMAGES AND PRODUCTS LIABILITY.
Considering the lengthy history of the doctrine of punitive dam-
ages, and the many years in which liability insurance has been
available, it is surprising that the courts have been faced with so
relatively few cases dealing not only with the question as to
whether the insurance policy should cover punitive damages, but
also whether punitive damages are appropriate awards in products
liability litigation.
A. Historical Development of Punitive Damages.
One of the earliest, if not the first, recorded references to puni-
tive damages can be found in the Bible.1" The origin of punitive
damages in Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence can be seen in the early
16 See the cases collected in Hoenig & Werber, supra note 13. See also Evans
v. General Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1966); Schemel v. General
Motors Corp., 384 F.2d 802 (7th Cir. 1967); Walz v. Erie-Lackawanna R.R.,
CCH PRODS. LIAB. REP. 5 5722 (N.D. Ind. 1967); Schumard v. General Motors
Corp., 270 F. Supp. 311 (S.D. Ohio 1967); Willis v. Chrysler Corp., 264 F.
Supp. 1010 (S.D. Tex. 1967); Burkhard v. Short, CCH PRODS. LiAn. REP. 5
6605 (Ohio App. 1971); Edgar v. Nachman, 37 App. Div. 2d 86, 323 N.Y.S.2d
53 (1971); Rivera v. Rockford, 1 Ill. App. 3d 647, 274 N.E.2d 828 (1971);
Walton v. Chrysler Corp., 229 So. 2d 568 (Miss. 1970).
17 "For all manner of trespass, whether it be for ox, for ass, for sheep, for
raiment, or for any manner of lost thing, which another challengeth to be his,
the cause of both parties shall come before the judges; and whom the judges
shall condemn, he shall pay double unto his neighbor." Exodus 22:9 (King
James).
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English common law; 8 and, in this country, they became firmly
established early in the life of the Colonies."9
There are, essentially, three reasons that are suggested in the
cases for the origin of the rule of punitive damages. First, the rule
developed because of a refusal of some early courts to grant new
trials when excessive damages were awarded in cases involving
some form of malice, oppression, or fraud." Secondly, the doctrine
arose because of other early courts' failure to recognize certain
injuries (e.g., mental anguish) as a proper measurement of dam-
ages." Thirdly, punitive damages became a vehicle to reimburse
the plaintiff for damages not otherwise legally compensable (e.g.,
litigation expenses).' While there are those who maintain that
punitive damages have now outlived their usefulness and should
be abolished,' the doctrine appears to be firmly established in all
except the following four states: Louisiana,' Massachusetts,'
Nebraska.' and Washington."
B. Modern Definitions and Trends
It is important, at the outset, to define punitive damages as the
18 Huckle v. Money, 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (K.B. 1763).
19 See T. SEDGEWICK, A TREATISE ON THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES § 347, et
seq. (1912); C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES S 78 (1935).
20 Earl v. Tupper, 45 Vt. 275 (1873). See also Washington, Damages in Con-
tract at Common Law, 47 LAw Q. REV. 345, 358 (1931); Note, Exemplary
Damages in the Law of Torts, 70 HARV. L. REV. 517, 520 (1957).
"See Stewart v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 18 S.W. 351 (Tex. 1855).
2 See Walther & Plein, Punitive Damages: A Critical Analysis, 49 MARQ. L.
REV. 369, 371 (1965); Cole, Can Damages Properly Be Punitive, 6 JOHN MAR-
SHALL L.Q. 477 (1941); Annot., 123 A.L.R. 1115 (1939); 25 C.J.S. Damages
117 (1966).
"See Ghiardi, Should Punitive Damages Be Abolished? -A Statement for
the Aflirmative, SECTION OF INS., NEGL. & COMp. Lw (1965); Duffy, Punitive
Damages: A Doctrine Which Should be Abolished, THE CASE AGAINST PUNITIVE
DAMAGES (Defense Research Institute, Inc., 1969).
'Vincent v. Morgan, 140 La. 1027, 74 So. 541 (1917). General Accident
Fire & Life Assurance Corp. v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 243 So. 2d 865
(La. App. 1971). The dictum in these cases suggests that Louisiana perhaps will
allow punitive damages in a nominal amount. At any rate, Louisiana allows
"compensatory" damages for mental anguish, humiliation and embarrassment,
upon a showing of deliberation, wilfulness or forcefulness.
2"Burt v. Advertiser Newspaper Co., 154 Mass. 238, 28 N.E. 1 (1891).
21 Boyer v. Barr, 8 Neb. 68 (1878).
2T Spokane Truck & Dray Co. v. Hoefer, 2 Wash. 45, 25 P. 1072 (1891);
Steele v. Johnson, 458 P.2d 889 (Wash. 1969). Washington does not have the
doctrine of punitive damages absent statutory authorization.
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words are usually used today. The term is somewhat vague and
uncertain; and its meaning can vary from state to state, or from
court to court. One of the best definitions can be found in an early
Florida case:
Compensatory damages are defined as such as arise from actual
and indirect pecuniary loss, mental suffering, value of time, actual
expenses, and bodily pain and suffering. Exemplary, vindictive or
punitory [sic] damages areas such as blend together the interests of
society and of the aggrieved individual, and are not only a recom-
pense to the sufferer but also a punishment to the offender and an
example to the community.
Punitive damages are usually defined to mean that the related mis-
conduct is intentional, malicious, or consists of action or inaction
that is so grossly wilful or which indicates such a conscious, aggra-
vated disregard of others that a jury could conclude that the con-
duct takes on a criminal character regardless whether it is punish-
able as an offense against the State.
Punitive damages are therefore not based on conduct that is
either simple negligence or is described as "wilful and wanton"
under a state's compensatory automobile guest statute; unless, of
course, the conduct amounts to such as to justify punitive damages
as defined by the courts. In wrongful death actions, (that are cre-
ated by statutes that provide a compensatory recovery) punitive
damages have been held not permissible, since punitive damages
by definition are not compensatory recoveries.'
While some courts consider punitive damages as extra compen-
sation to the plaintiff," the overwhelming majority view is that they
serve to punish and deter." For example, the Pattern Jury Instruc-
21 S.H. Kress & Co. v. Powell, 132 Fla. 471, 180 So, 757 (1938).
2"See Baird v. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R., 11 111. App. 3d 264, 296 N.E.2d 365
(1973).
"Tedesco v. Maryland Cas. Co., 127 Conn. 533, 18 A.2d 357 (1941).
81 Northwestern Nat'l Cas, Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962).
See generally 40 MIcH. L. REV. 128 (1941). See also Note, Exemplary Damages
in the Law of Torts, supra note 20; H. OLECK, DAMAGES TO PERSONS AND PROP-
ERTY § 275 (1957). For recent cases, see: CALIFORNIA: Topanga Corp. v.
Gentile, 1 Cal. App. 3d 572, 81 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1969). GEORGIA: Metro
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v. Pearce, 121 Ga. App. 835, 175 S.E.2d 910 (1970).
(The jury can assess damages for deterring the wrongdoer, or as compensation
for the wounded feelings of the plaintiff; however, it cannot assess damages for
the double purpose of punishment and prevention.) KANSAS: Sweaney v. United
Loan & Fin. Co., 205 Kan. 66, 468 P.2d. 124 (1970). NEW MEXICO: Galindo
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tion on punitive damages given to the jury in Illinois states as
follows:
... if you believe that justice and the public good requires it, you
may, in addition to any damages to which you find plaintiff en-
titled, award plaintiff an amount which will serve to punish the de-
fendant and to deter others from the commission of like offenses.
The Restatement of Torts, § 903, also recognizes punitive dam-
ages to be those damages, other than compensatory damages,
awarded against a person to punish him for his outrageous con-
duct.'
Until the last several years, punitive damage awards in products
liability litigation were relatively rare, and few courts have been
faced with the issue whether these types of damages are even
proper in products liability cases. The present trend of some courts
in permitting this form of recovery, and the increasing contentions
made by plaintiffs in products cases to apply the legal theories of
punitive damages, require continual and vigorous defense efforts
to insure the judicial restraint necessary to equitably balance cur-
rent social and "consumerism" demands with needed technological
and economic development under this country's free enterprise
system.
The "windfall" nature to an injured party of punitive damages,"
and the enormous jury verdicts that have been rendered in the past
few years in products liability litigation, easily illustrate the finan-
cial problem facing the aircraft manufacturer. A jury award of
over $20,000,000 against Beech Aircraft in a products case in
California' is probably the recent case most familiar to the avia-
tion community. A jury award of over $10,000,000 in punitive
v. Western States Collection Co., 82 N.M. 149, 477 P.2d 325 (1970). NEW
YORK: Gordon v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 309 N.Y.S.2d 415 (1970). OHIO:
Trainor v. Deters, 22 Ohio App. 2d 135, 259 N.E.2d 131 (1969). PENNSYL-
VANIA: Focht v. Rabada, 217 Pa. Super. 35, 268 A.2d 157 (1970). SOUTH
CAROLINA: Gilbert v. Duke Power Co., 255 S.C. 495, 179 S.E.2d 720 (1971).
WISCONSIN: Mid-Continent Refrigerator Co. v. Straka, 47 Wis. 2d 739, 178
N.W.2d 28 (1970).
"See also Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 HARv. L. REV. 1173
(1931).
"
3 See Ghiardi, The Case Against Punitive Damages, 8 THE FORUM 411
(1972).
" Pease v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 38 Cal. App. 3d 450, 113 Cal. Rptr. 416
(1974).
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damages against another aircraft manufacturer' also suggests the
very serious potential economic exposure that face manufacturers
in defending their products in today's social climate with its asso-
ciated consumerism demands.
The award of punitive damages to injured consumers is not,
however, an entirely new theory of liability. Rather substantial
judicial precedent can be found in the case law for recovery of
such damages by a consumer who is a victim of fraud or decep-
tion in the sale to him of consumer goods." However, an award of
punitive damages based only on a defect in the product is an exten-
sion of a manufacturer's liability that goes far beyond a recovery
for consumer fraud or deceit in the product, and is an area of
products liability law that requires constant judicial re-examination
and restraint in order to insure that such awards are permitted only
in those situations in which the public interest demands protection
from clearly proved intentional and outrageous conduct of a manu-
facturer. To allow the theory of punitive damage awards to be
applied across the board in products liability cases-absent clear
evidence of consumer fraud and deceit-is an unjustified and un-
warranted extension of a manufacturer's potential liability if an
equitable balance between the manufacturer and the consuming
public is to maintain a valid goal in our free enterprise society.
The cost to any manufacturer of punitive damage verdicts, based
only on the manufacturing process, must ultimately be paid in any
event by the consuming public; and since punitive damages are
almost universally recognized"' as a form of "civil punishment" to
a defendant, the consuming public would otherwise ultimately end
up "punishing" itself through increased prices of the products. The
consuming public's interests can be protected by limiting punitive
damage awards only to clearly proved cases involving elements of
fraud or deceit to the consumer. Otherwise, the long term conse-
quences of judicial failure to equitably balance the interest of the
consumer with that of the manufacturer will result in either protec-
tive legislation (that is restrictive to the consumer) to insure need-
ed technological and economic progress, or will result in drastic
11 Rosendin v. Avco-Lycoming Corp., Superior Court, Santa Clara County,
Cal., Mar. 8, 1972.
"o See generally Rice, Exemplary Damages in Private Consumer Actions, 55
IOWA L. REV. 307 (1969).
'Notes 31 & 32 supra.
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changes in the entire adversary system of compensation for
product-induced injuries that would not be in the consuming pub-
lic's interest. Competitive factors in the market place is a sufficient
deterrent to a manufacturer when punished in a civil suit for con-
duct amounting to fraud or deceit in the manufacturing and selling
processes. Punitive damage awards that are permitted on any lesser
proof does not serve to equitably balance both the consumer and
the manufacturer's interests.
C. Fraud and Deceit Theories and Product Liability
Fraud and deceit is essentially an intentional tort; under the
Restatement,8 it consists of several substantive elements. First of
all, there must be a false representation on the part of the defend-
ant, made with actual knowledge of its falsity, and with the inten-
tion of inducing a party to act or refrain from' acting on the
representation. There must also be a justifiable detrimental reliance
by the plaintiff on the false representation.
Although there is some authority that permits punitive, as well
as compensatory damages, on proof only that the tort has been
committed," the majority and better reasoned view is that a claim
for punitive damages, in an action based on the elements of fraud
or deceit, must also be supported by evidence of conduct amount-
ing to either malice, or of a spirit akin to criminal indifference to
civil obligations."0 The same legal considerations that are involved
in punitive damage awards in the typical consumer fraud case '1
31 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 525 (1936); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF TORTS 685-86 (4h ed. 1971).
"9See Weatherford v. Home Fin. Co., 225 S.C. 313, 82 S.E.2d 196 (1954).
40 1District Motor Co. v. Rodill, 88 A.2d 489 (D.C. Mun. Ct. 1952). Punitive
damages in an action for fraud are proper where it appears that the defendant
acted maliciously, wantonly, oppressively or with a spirit of mischief or criminal
indifference to civil obligations. However, some states that profess to follow the
majority in requiring an additional showing of "legal malice" have substantially
liberalized that concept. See Jones v. Westside Buick Co., 231 Mo. App. 187,
93 S.W.2d 1083 (1936). "Legal malice" means simply the intentional doing of
a wrongful act without just cause or excuse, and not the necessity for the show-
ing of any spite or ill will, or that the act was willfully or wantonly done. Id.
at 199, 93 S.W.2d at 1088.
41 For a persuasive argument of the case for punitive damages in consumer
fraud cases, see Walker v. Sheldon, 10 N.Y.2d 401, 179 N.E.2d 497, 223
N.Y.S.2d 488 (1961). In the Court's majority opinion, Judge Fuld argues that
those who deliberately and coolly engage in a far-flung fraudulent
scheme, systematically conducted for profit, are very much more
likely to pause and consider the consequences if they have to pay
1974]
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are relevant in the area of product liability law. They become
highly relevant where an attempt is made to apply the basic pur-
pose of a punitive damage award to a manufacturer's liability for de-
fects in their products, absent any evidence of consumer fraud or
deceit.
One of the first punitive damage awards permitted in a case
having products liability overtones was Standard Oil v. Gunn,'
decided by the Alabama Supreme Court in 1937. In this case, the
plaintiff's automobile was damaged because adulterated low grade
oil, represented by Standard Oil to be high grade oil, was sold to
and used by the plaintiff. Although the action was based on fraud
and deceit, as well as breach of contract, the litigation revolved
around the existence of a defective product-the adulterated low
grade oil. The Alabama Supreme Court upheld a jury verdict for
punitive damages based on the jury's finding that Standard Oil,
through its agents, had acted fraudulently (by its misrepresenta-
tions) toward the plaintiff. Surprisingly, Standard Oil stands alone,
and has been ignored by the appellate courts for over 36 years. '
However, in the latter 1960's when imaginative counsel resur-
rected punitive damage theories and argued their application to
products liability cases, the confusion that arose from this seem-
ingly "new" exposure of the manufacturer has unfortunately re-
sulted in a failure of the judiciary to clarify fully the theories upon
more than the actual loss suffered by the individual plaintiff. An
occasional award of compensatory damages against such parties
would have little deterrent effect . . . . In the calculation of his ex-
pected profits, the wrongdoer is likely to allow for a certain
amount of money which will have to be returned to those who
object too vigorously, and he will be perfectly content to bear the
additional cost of litigation as the price for continuing his illicit
business.
Id. at 404, 179 N.E.2d at 499, 223 N.Y.S.2d at 492. Although suggesting that
punitive damages would serve as an inducement to litigate in those cases where
compensatory damages alone would not suffice, Judge Fuld's principal reliance
seems to be based on the punishment deterrence ground. See also Comment,
Translating Sympathy for Deceived Consumers Into Eflective Programs for Pro-
tection, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 395, 426-27 (1966). See also Developments in the
Law- Deceptive Advertising, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1005, 1123 (1967).
1234 Ala. 598, 176 So. 332 (1937).
'
3Although Standard Oil Co. v. Gunn seems to stand alone in awarding
punitive damages in products liability cases based on fraud and deceit, awards
of compensatory damages in similar actions are more readily found. See L.
FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY ch. 4 (1971); R. HURSH, AMER-
ICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY §§ 4.2-4.5 (1961).
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which punitive damage awards in product litigation may or may
not be appropriate. This failure has in turn led, in the early 1970's,
to untoward attempts to extend punitive damage theories to prod-
ucts liability cases when elements of consumer fraud or deceit are
not even involved.
The application of punitive damage theories to products lia-
bility cases attracted renewed interest in 1967 in Toole v. Rich-
ardson-Merrell, Inc." The California Court of Appeals in Toole
upheld a punitive damage award based on evidence that some
corporate officers of the manufacturer not only knew of the dan-
gerous effects of the drug, MER/29, but also intentionally with-
held that information from the Food and Drug Administration.
In Toole, it was the defendant's continuous act of promoting the
sale of the drug with actual knowledge of its dangerous side effects
(thereby meeting requirements under the Restatement for the tort
of fraud and deceit) that satisfied California statutory punitive
damage requirements' of "malice" and thus permitted the imposi-
tion of punitive damages. Apparently no argument was raised on
appeal of the general propriety of a punitive damage award in a
products liability situation. Nor did the California Court clarify
that the ground rules for the imposition of punitive damages in
products cases required proof of the elements of the common law
tort of fraud and deceit, even though this was what the case was
really all about.
To add to the confusion,the Second Circuit Court of appeals
also in 1967, in another MER/29 case, reversed a jury verdict
against the defendant for punitive damages. In Roginsky v. Rich-
ardson-Merrell, Inc.," plaintiff sued under both negligence and
fraud theories; and the court, in a lengthy opinion, held that the
record contained insufficient evidence of fraudulent conduct so as
to sustain the jury's verdict for punitive damages under New York
law. Although the court in Roginsky did not address itself directly
to the issue whether punitive damage awards should be permitted
44251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967).
45CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294 (West 1971), which in relevant parts provides:
"In an action for breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where the
defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, express or implied,
the plaintiff, in addition to actual damages, may recover damages for the sake
of example and by way of punishing the defendant."
378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967).
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as a general rule in products cases, absent evidence of fraud, the
court did attempt to balance the consumer interests with those of
the drug manufacturer:
Although multiple punitive awards running into the hundreds may
not add up to a denial of due process, nevertheless if we were
sitting as the highest court of New York we would wish to consider
very seriously whether awarding punitive damages with respect
to the negligent-even highly negligent-manufacture and sale of a
drug governed by federal food and drug requirements... would not
do more harm than good. A manufacturer distributing a drug to
many thousands of users under government regulation scarcely
requires this additional measure for manifesting social disapproval
and assuring deterrence. Criminal penalties and heavy compensa-
tory damages, recoverable under some circumstances even without
proof of negligence, should sufficiently meet these objectives . . .,7
The court in Roginsky thus reasoned that since punitive damage
awards are ultimately passed on to the consuming public, the de-
terrent value of punitive damages, in addition to heavy compensa-
tory damages that are recoverable under some circumstances even
without proof of negligence was "probably needless." Although
both the Second Circuit in Roginsky and the California Court in
Toole"8 indirectly required proof of some evidence of fraudulent
conduct before applying the theories of punitive damages in the
products cases before them, neither court clearly set forth the
criteria contained in the Restatement" (on which the facts in both
cases actually revolved) for the tort of fraud and deceit.
The effects of the resulting confusion can be aptly demonstrated
by the 1970 decisions of the Illinois Appellate and Supreme Courts
in Moore v. Jewel Tea Co." Eleven months before the accident,
the plaintiff in Moore purchased a can of "Drano" that she then
stored in her kitchen. The can remained unopened during the
eleven month storage period, and exploded when the plaintiff took
it from under the sink to use it. The complaint alleged strict tort
liability, negligence and wilful and wanton conduct and prayed for
4 Id. at 840-41.
4251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967).
49 Supra note 38.
"0The Illinois appellate decision can be found in 116 Ill. App. 2d 109, 253
N.E.2d 636 (1969); the Illinois Supreme Court opinion can be found in 46 fll.
2d 288, 263 N.E.2d 103 (1970).
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both compensatory and punitive damages. Her injuries (blindness
in both eyes) resulted in a jury verdict against the manufacturer
of $920,000 in compensatory damages and $10,000 in punitive
damages.
In affirming the jury's verdict as to punitive damages, the Illinois
appellate court in 1969 referred initially to "well established" Illi-
nois precedent that permitted punitive damages where there is evi-
dence of "wilful and wanton conduct" (citing only a 1958 Illinois
decision 1 that involved an automobile accident). The appellate
court then referred to three Illinois cases; one involved adultery,
another the definition of malice, and the third involved fraud in
an employment contract. The court then stated that "such issues
[wilful and wanton] are not unknown in products liability cases,""
and cited as authority for that statement the California decision in
Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc." (which dealt with a California
statutory" definition of "malice" and actually involved the common
law tort of fraud and deceit, and not "wilful and wanton" defini-
tions). Following the misapplication of these cases, the Illinois
appellate court then concluded that the
knowledge by the defendants of the potential dangerousness of
their product, coupled with the notice to them of prior claims of
spontaneous explosions and their failure to warn the public as they
did their own employees presented a question for the jury to deter-
mine whether the defendants were guilty of wanton and wilful
conduct."
The court further stated that "the question of wilful and wanton
conduct is essentially whether the failure to exercise care is so
gross that it shows a lack of regard for the safety of others";' an
extremely broad and loose definition. The appellate court thus
affirmed the $10,000 punitive damage verdict in three brief para-
51 Madison v. Wigal, 18 Il. App. 2d 564, 153 N.E.2d 90 (1958).
12 Seifert v. Solem, 387 F.2d 925 (7th Cir. 1967); Peters v. Lake, 66 fli. 206
(1872); Chapin v. Tampoorlos, 325 Ill. App. 219, 59 N.E.2d 334 (1945). The
court also cited RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, § 908.
53253 N.E.2d at 648.
"'251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967).
' CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294 (West 1971).
"8253 N.E.2d at 649.
57Id.
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graphs of an otherwise very lengthy opinion that also affirmed the
$920,000 compensatory award.
The additional confusion that the appellate decision in Moore
created in products liability litigation as it relates to punitive dam-
ages was worsened when the Illinois Supreme Court, in its 1970
opinion58 affirming the appellate court, made no mention whatso-
ever of either the punitive damage verdict or the legal bases on
which such liability should be permitted in products liability liti-
gation.
The latest expression of Illinois law as to punitive damages is
the 1973 decision of the appellate court in Pierce v. DeJong,"
where the court stated as follows:
We turn finally to the award of $5,000 as punitive damages. Puni-
tive damages are not "a favorite in the law" and are allowable only
where the conduct is accompanied by aggravated circumstances
such as wilfullness, malice, fraud or violence ... [citing Illinois
cases]. There is no evidence in this record as the trial court ob-
served in its opinion "that defendants or any of them set out with
deliberate intent to harm anyone's property or inflict any damage
on the plaintiff.""
By these comments, the appellate court in Pierce clarified to
some extent the definition of punitive damages that were made
applicable to wilful and wanton conduct three years earlier by the
Illinois appellate court in Moore.
Although a few courts at the appellate level have thus recently
dealt with punitive damages in products liability cases, they have
not yet discussed fully the theory upon which such a recovery may
or may not be appropriate. As a result, all manufacturers continue
to be faced today with increasing punitive damage claims at the
trial court level; and neither the defendants nor the plaintiffs in
such cases are yet able to effectively evaluate their respective posi-
tions, unless the factual situation raises issues of consumer fraud
or deceit such as those involved in the MER/29 cases."
D. Negligence vs. Strict Liability and Punitive Damages
As a conceptual matter, the duty to refrain from negligent con-
5846 Ill. 2d 288, 263 N.E.2d 103 (1970).
11 13 Il. App. 3d 889, 300 N.E.2d 782 (1973).
60 ld. at -, 300 N.E.2d at 785.
"' See cases cited notes 44 & 46 supra.
MANUFACTURER'S LIABILITY
duct in products cases is little different from that in other negli-
gence cases, since the test of liability depends upon whether the
manufacturer has maintained a reasonable standard of perform-
ance." Such a standard can very often be found in the conduct of
other manufacturers, as well as in the governmental certification
procedures that all aviation manufacturers must follow in the de-
sign and manufacture of their aircraft."
As is evident from the enormous jury verdicts for punitive dam-
ages returned against manufacturers in the last few years," aircraft
manufacturers face very substantial financial exposure that was
unheard of, in most cases, at the time the product was designed
and manufactured. With all of the government regulations in the
aircraft manufacturing industry, and the very heavy compensatory
awards now being given to injured parties, the New York court in
Roginsky was perhaps correct when it indicated that the imposi-
tion of punitive damages as a deterrent is a needless doctrine to be
imposed on manufacturers in today's society. In today's economic
climate, a single manufacturer can be exposed to a multiplicity of
claims for punitive damages, with no clear guidelines or consis-
tency in application of the doctrine. This inconsistency raises seri-
ous Constitutional questions."' The reawakening of consumer de-
mands, competition in the market place, the higher and higher
verdicts for compensatory damages, the general inflationary spiral,
current union and labor demands, governmental regulation-all
of these often-conflicting interests support the thought that the
doctrine of punitive damages, if they are to be applied to products
cases, must be applied with the utmost caution, and with the great-
est judicial restraint and understanding of the problems of the
62 Supra note 2. See generally the cases collected in J. FLEMMING, LAW OF
TORTS 140 (2d ed. 1961); Green, Foreseeability in Negligence Law, 61 COLUM.
L. REV. 1401 (1961); Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 249 N.E.2d 419
(1969); Noel, Manufacturer of Products- The Drift Toward Strict Liability,
24 TENN. L. REV. 963 (1957); L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY
§ 12.03 (1968); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS (4th ed. 1971).
See also North American Aviation v. Hughes, 247 F.2d 517 (9th Cir. 1957);
Becker v. American Airlines, 200 F. Supp. 839 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); Cope v. Air
Associates, 283 I11. App. 40 (1935); cf. Boeing Airplane Co. v. Brown, 291 F.2d
310 (9th Cir. 1961).
6s Supra note 7.
Supra notes 34 & 35.
378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967).
e Cf. Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464 (1958).
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aircraft manufacturer in today's society. No responsible manage-
ment would probably quarrel with the principle that if they were
to engage in acts that amount to a fraud on the public in the
manufacture and distribution of their product, they should then
be held accountable through the civil procedures now established.
However, compared with the ordinary products liability case, avia-
tion accidents are more spectacular, the resulting damages are
more severe, and the personal tragedies attendant to such accidents
oftentimes tempt juries to decide liabilitiy issues by hindsight, in-
consistency, sympathy and speculation. The reversal, or the grant-
ing of new trials, in some of the products cases involving punitive
damages indicates that some courts are making efforts to balance
more equitably the conflicting social and economic questions in-
volved in all product design problems.
When a plaintiff relies on a strict liability theory, logic compels
the conclusion that punitive damages are inappropriate. Under
strict tort liability, all the plaintiff need prove is that there was a
defect that made the product unreasonably dangerous at the time
it left the manufacturer's control and that the injury was proxi-
mately caused by the defect."7 Punitive damages, on the other hand,
are intended to be a form of civil punishment and are intended to
be applied only in those situations where the wrongful acts are in-
tentional, fraudulent, malicious, or are of such an outrageous char-
acter that there is little doubt that the reprehensible act justifiies
the imposition of such an extraordinary remedy. 8 Punitive damages
cannot therefore be justified on mere proof that a defective product
was manufactured and distributed by a defendant. The difficulty,
of course, lies in the fact that plaintiffs are usually permitted to
sue under alternate theories of liabilities, all of which may go to
the jury."' Since a jury may be instructed that proof of a defect
under strict liability theories is sufficient to impose liability, the
necessity of a much more careful analysis and balancing of social
and economic interests by the trial court become more apparent in
a products case than in the ordinary negligence action.
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 402A. See also cases cited note 2 supra.
68Supra notes 31 & 32.
69 See, e.g., Moore v. Jewel Tea Co., 116 Ill. App. 2d 109, 253 N.E.2d 636
(1969), afl'd 46 Ill. 2d 288, 263 N.E.2d 103 (1970).
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E. The Insurance Policy and the Public Policy
The legal issues involved in insurance coverage for punitive
damages are basically twofold: contract interpretation, and public
policy. Of the two, public policy should be by far the most impor-
tant consideration. With one recent exception,"0 no case has been
found where the court has prohibited such coverage where it did
not consider, and base its decision on, the public policy issues. On
the other hand, those few courts which have permitted such cover-
age often fail to discuss the public policy purposes of punitive





No standard insurance policy form used today contains an ex-
press exclusion for punitive damages. Typically, the policy pro-
vides that the insurance company shall be obligated to pay on be-
half of the insured all sums which the insured shall become legally
obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury.'
The Early Cases
There are some earlier decisions73 which interpreted the pre-
1966 standard insurance policy forms to cover both compensatory
and punitive damages, but most of these cases are now of doubtful
70See Brown v. Western Cas. & Sur. Co., 484 P.2d 1252 (Colo. App. 1971).
In this case, the insured contended that since punitive damages were not spe-
cifically excluded from the policy (standard form), they were included. In quot-
ing from and citing Universal Indem. Ins. Co. v. Tenery, 96 Colo. 10, 39 P.2d
776 (1934), the court in Brown stated as follows: "From the above it is clear
that exemplary damages are not awarded 'because of bodily injury.' They are
not compensatory and are not covered by the above quoted provision of the
policy." 484 P.2d at 1253.
71 Pennsylvania Threshermen & Farmers Mut. Cas. Co. v. Thornton, 244
F.2d 823 (4th Cir. 1957); United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Janich, 3 F.R.D.
16 (S.D. Cal. 1943); Carroway v. Johnson, 245 S.C. 200, 139 S.E.2d 908 (1965).
72 United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Janich, 3 F.R.D. 16, 19 (S.D. Cal. 1943);
Carroway v. Johnson, 245 S.C. 200, -, 139 S.E.2d 908, 910 (1965).
7
'See United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Janich, 3 F.R.D. 16 (S.D. Cal.
1943), which involved unusually broad policy language; Employers Ins. Co. v.
Brock, 172 So. 671 (Ala. 1937), which involved Alabama's unique wrongful
death statute which views all damages for wrongful death as punitive; Maryland
as. Co. v. Baker, 304 Ky. 296, 200 S.W.2d 757 (1947), which involved public
carriers. See also General Cas. Co. v. Woodby, 238 F.2d 452 (6th Cir. 1956);
Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Welfare Fin. Co., 75 F.2d 58 (8th Cir. 1934), cert. denied,
295 U.S. 734 (1935); United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Janich, 3 F.R.D. 16
(S.D. Cal. 1943); Pennsylvania Threshermen & Farmers' Mut. Cas. Co. v.
Thornton, 244 F.2d 823 (4th Cir. 1957).
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precedence, since the language of current standard policies is sub-
stantially different from that used twenty or thirty years ago.
More and more courts in recent years have held categorically
that one cannot insure against his own liability for punitive dam-
ages as a matter of public policy. A few early courts also discussed
the public policy considerations. In Universal Indemnity Insurance
Co. v. Tenery," a Colorado court in 1934 recognized the deterrent
effect of punitive damages:
The insurance company did not participate in this wrong, and was
under no contract to indemnify against such .... The injured will
not be allowed to collect from a non-participating party for a
wrong against the public.75
In Tedesco v. Maryland Casualty Company,"0 a Connecticut
court in 1941 held that since it was obviously against public policy
to permit an insurance company to pay its insureds' fines for
criminal violations, the burden of non-compensatory punitive dam-
ages that the court recognized as a form of civil punishment was
also prohibited as a matter of public policy.
Modern View
The leading case in this entire problem area, with the most per-
suasive and clearest formulation of the public policy arguments
that prohibit, as a general rule, insurance coverage for punitive
damages is the decision of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Northwestern National Casualty Company v. McNulty."" The in-
surance policy involved in McNulty was a typical family combina-
tion automobile policy that agreed to pay on behalf of the insured
all sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay
as damages because of bodily injuries. The policy was issued in
the State of Virginia where the insured resided, and the accident
happened in Florida. The insured, a drunken driver, while going
eighty miles per hour smashed into the rear of the plaintiff's car;
and then left the scene. The jury returned a verdict for $37,500
7496 Colo. 10, 39 P.2d 776 (1934).
751d. at -, 39 P.2d at 779.
7 127 Conn. 533, 18 A.2d 357 (1941). See also Ohio Cas. Co. v. Welfare
Fin. Co., 75 F.2d 58 (8th Cir. 1934); Malonga v. Manufacturers Cas. Ins. Co.,
28 N.J. 220, 146 A.2d 105 (1958).
77 307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962).
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in compensatory damages and for $20,000 in punitive damages.
The policy limits were $50,000. On appeal, the insurer's argument
that the language of the insurance contract did not cover punitive
damages was not reached by the Court:
We find it unnecessary to construe the contract; we hold that
should a policy provide specifically for such coverage it would
contravene public policy."8
The court in McNulty initially recognized that the strength of a
public policy against insuring punitive damages depended on the
nature or purpose of punitive damages. The court held that "the
most widely accepted basis for punitive damages in other American
jurisdictions" 9 was that punitive damages are imposed as a means
of punishment and deterrence. Since this is the basic purpose of
punitive damages, the court concluded that:
there are especially strong public policy reasons for not allowing
socially irresponsible automobile drivers to escape the element of
personal punishment in punitive damages when they are guilty of
reckless slaughter or maiming on the highway."'
To permit an insured to shift the burden of punitive damages to
his insurance carrier would frustrate the reason for the existence
of the doctrine. The court in McNulty declared that:
[Punitive] damages do not compensate the plaintiff for his injury
since compensatory damages already have made the plaintiff
whole. And there is no point in punishing the insurance company;
it has done no wrong. In actual fact, of course, and considering
the extent to which the public is insured, the burden would ulti-
mately come to rest not on the insurance companies but on the
public, since the added liability to the insurance companies would
be passed along to the premium payers. Society would then be
punishing itself for the wrong committed by the insured.8
Since the 1962 decision in McNulty, courts in Arizona," Arkan-
7 81 Id. at 434.
79 Id. at 436.
10Id. at 441.
81 Id. at 440-41.
82 Price v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 208 Ariz. 485, 508 P.2d 522 (1972).
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sas," Colorado," Florida," Missouri," New Jersey,"' New York,"
Pennsylvania," South Carolina,"9 Tennessee," and the 10th Cir-
cuit,"' have done so; and of these only Arizona, Arkansas and
Tennessee have specifically considered and rejected the public pol-
icy rationale expressed in McNulty."
In fact, there appear to be only four relatively recent cases m
the country that hold that there is insurance coverage for punitive
damages under the provisions of a standard insurance policy. In
Carroway v. Johnston," the Supreme Court of South Carolina held
in 1965 that the words "all sums" of the insurance policy included
punitive damages. The authorities relied upon by the court in Carro-
way indicate, however, that this case is very questionable authority
since the court relied upon cases dealing with vicarious liability,"
cases based on unique statutes," and cases involving estoppel on a
combined compensatory/punitive default judgment."7 None of the
cases cited by the Carroway court were really on point," and the
court did not even consider any public policy issues.
1Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Daniels, 246 Ark. 970, 440 S.W.2d
582 (1969).
"Brown v. Western Cas. & Sur. Co., 484 P.2d 1252 (Colo. App. 1971).
8Nicholson v. American Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 177 So. 2d 52 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1965); Ging v. American Liberty Ins. Co., 293 F. Supp. 756 (N.D. Fla.
1968).
"Crull v. Gleb, 382 S.W.2d 17 (Mo. App. 1964).
87 LoRocco v. New Jersey Mfrs. Indem. Ins. Co., 82 N.J. Super. 323, 197
A.2d 591 (1964).
88 Teska v. Atlantic Nat'l Ins. Co., 59 Misc. 2d 615, 300 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1969).
9Esmond v. Liscia, 209 Pa. Super. 200, 224 A.2d 793 (1966).
"Carroway v. Johnson, 245 S.C. 200, 139 S.E.2d 908 (1965).
9'Lazenby v. Universal Und. Ins. Co., 214 Tenn. 639, 383 S.W.2d 1 (1964).
92American Sur. Co. v. Gold, 375 F.2d 523 (10th Cir. 1966).
93 South Carolina, which has held punitive damages covered, has done so only
on the basis of contract interpretation and has not specifically rejected a public
policy argument. See Carroway v. Johnson, 245 S.C. 200, 139 S.E.2d 908 (1965).
94Id.
"The court relied on Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Welfare Fin. Co., 75 F.2d 58
(8th Cir. 1934), which involved vicarious liability and was not on point.
16The court cited American Fid. & Cas. Co. v. Werfel, 164 So. 383 (Ala.
1935), which dealt with unique Alabama statutes and was not on point.
9" The court relied on Pennsylvania Threshermen & Farmers' Mut. Cas. Ins.
Co. v. Thornton, 244 F.2d 823 (4th Cir. 1957).
"The court also cites 7 J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW & PRACTICE § 4312,
4900 (1962). However, Appleman gave no consideration to the many weak-
nesses in the cases he cites. Many courts have cited Appleman in holding that
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In Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Co. v. Daniel,"
decided by the Arkansas Supreme Court in 1969, a majority of
the court, relying heavily on Carroway,"' reasoned that the differ-
ence between punitive and compensatory damages was not clear;
and believing that there was no public policy against the result,
held that punitive damages were within the contractual terms of
the policy. A very strong and lengthy dissent based primarily on
public policy grounds was made.1"'
In 1972, the Supreme Court of Arizona in Price v. Hartford
Accident & Indemnity Co.," a declaratory judgment action, held
in essence that the public policy of Arizona to require an insurance
carrier to honor its contractual obligations (to pay all sums for
which the insured may be liable) overrode any public policy to
prohibit insurance coverage for punitive damages. The plaintiff in
Price had a typical automobile policy with limits of $1,000,000.
punitive damages are covered under liability insurance policies. Appleman is
about the only treatise in modem times to take the position that, as a general
rule, coverage for punitive damages is not against public policy. Appleman sim-
ply states that the average insured expects such coverage. The public policy ra-
tionale is unsound according to Appleman, in that
defendant's conduct was not willful. He had no present intent to
injure plaintiff. Had his act been willful, in the sense that he in-
tended injury to the plaintiff, the insurer would have been com-
pletely absolved of liability. It seems strangely inconsistent for an
insurer, in one breath, to admit liability for compensatory dam-
ages, and then to deny liability for that part of an award claimed
attributable to reckless or wanton conduct ...
[Thel arguments apply with equal force to punitive damages. In
any event, a court should not aid an insurer which fails to exclude
liability for punitive damages. Surely there is nothing in the insuring
clause that would forewarn an insured that such was to be the
intent of the parties.
Id. at § 4312 (Supp. 1972).
By this comment, Appleman ignores the court's basic holding in McNulty
that the rule applies only when the conduct involved is "intentional," either in
the sense of a conscious intent to injure or a conscious, malicious and aggravated
disregard of another's rights. Also, later in his treatise, Appleman contradicts his
own position by stating in § 4312 that in cases "where the insured's conduct is
grossly violative of public policy, and punitive damages are awarded on that ac-
count, public policy may dictate that he should bear his own punishment... "
"246 Ark. 849, 440 S.W.2d 582 (1969).
00 245 S.C. 200, 139 S.E.2d 908 (1965).
101 As the dissent indicated, Carroway is worthless as precedent because of
a South Carolina statute requiring that a liability insurance policy must insure
"against loss from the liability imposed by law." 246 Ark. at -, 440 S.W.2d
at 585.
102 108 Ariz. 485, 502 P.2d 522 (1972).
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The insured's son injured another when he was drag racing the
insured automobile. Suit was filed against the son for gross negli-
gence, wantonness and recklessness, and against the insured for
negligent entrustment, alleging also that the son was the agent of
the insured. After quoting from the McNulty decision, the Arizona
court described what it believed to be six reasons why the McNulty
rule should not apply: (i) that drag racing is a criminal offense
and the son would be subject to punishment by the State for his
acts; (ii) Hartford voluntarily contracted to pay "all sums" and
received a premium based in part on the risk of punitive damages;
(iii) criminal penalties included possible loss by the son of his
driver's license and compulsory traffic school attendance; (iv) the
possibility that punitive damages may exceed policy limits is a
sufficient deterrent (the limits were $1,000,000 and the possibility
of a verdict against a teenager and his mother anywhere near the
limits was remote, so this portion of the court's ruling makes little
sense); (v) no evidence that failure to insure punitive damages
had decreased automobile accidents [thus the court inconsistently
argues that punitive damages serve no purpose as a deterrent]; and
(vi) an insurance carrier should honor its obligations. The court
seemed impressed with the statements made in Appleman °3 that
the insured expects punitive damage coverage, and cited only
Laznby v. Universal Underwriters Insurance Company" in support
of its conclusions.
In Lazenby, the Supreme Court of Tennessee in 1964 gave
essentially three reasons in holding that punitive damages were
covered under the policy: (i) that most courts have held there is
coverage as a matter of contract interpretation (the court cited no
authority for this proposition); (ii) that punitive damages cases
cannot be easily distinguished from ordinary negligence cases; and
(iii) that punitive damages do not deter undesirable conduct.
The latter two arguments of the court in Lazenby were ade-
quately and persuasively answered two years later by the Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in American Surety Company of
10 The court cited 7 J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4312
(1962). Cf. author's observations at note 8 supra.
104214 Tenn. 639, 383 S.W.2d 1 (1964).
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New York v. Gold," where the court as to the lack of deterrent
effect, stated that:
This argument seems to miss the mark, for we may as well say
criminal sanctions serve no useful purpose just because they are
constantly violated. The question is not so much the efficacy of the
policy underlying punitive damages; rather it is a question of the
implementation of that policy. Permitting the penalty for the mis-
deed to be levied on one other than he who committed it cannot
possibly implement the policy."°
As to the inability to distinguish between ordinary and punitive
damages, the court in Gold also stated:
We must assume, however, any given jury will accurately follow
the law and correctly distinguish liability for ordinary from liability
for gross and wanton negligence. To hold to the contrary would
impugn the integrity of the jury system.'"
Vicarious Liability Exception
It should be emphasized that in McNulty, the insured was both
the owner and operator of the vehicle involved in the accident;
and the insured, and he alone, was the one guilty of the conduct
causing the imposition of punitive damages. The McNulty court
recognized, however, that an employer is not prohibited from
obtaining insurance coverage to protect himself against liability for
punitive damages that are assessed against him for the wrongful
conduct of his employees-providing that the employer has not
directly or indirectly participated in the wrongful conduct. In
Illinois, this principle was also recognized in 1969 in Scott v.
Instant Parking, Inc.,"*' where the court, in holding that a $10,000
punitive damage award was covered, stated:
[this case] involves only the right of a corporation to insure against
liability [for punitive damage] caused by its agents and servants.
There is no reasonable basis to declare the latter type insurance is
against public policy."°
Since punitive damages can be awarded against a principal be-
101375 F.2d 523 (10th Cir. 1966).06 Id. at 527.
1071d.
1 105 Ill. App. 2d 133, 245 N.E.2d 124 (1969).
101 Id. at -, 245 N.E.2d at 126.
1974]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
cause of the act of his agent, as the courts in both McNulty and
Scott recognized, there is no logical reason why an employer who
doesn't actually participate in the wrongdoing should not be able
to shift the risk of this type of loss to an insurer. This concept has
been recognized for many years.
An Eighth Circuit decision in 1934 held that there is no viola-
tion of public policy for a carrier to insure damages resulting from
the acts of an employee for punitive damages, when the employer
did not participate in the conduct, authorize the conduct, or know
in advance that the employee would commit the wrongful act. The
court in Ohio Casualty Insurance Co. v. Welfare Finance Co."'
stated that
[i]n this situation where there was no direct or indirect volition upon
the part of the master in the commission of the act, no public pol-
icy is violated by protecting him from the unauthorized and un-
natural act of his servant."'
Other more recent cases in the Fifth Circuit, ' the Ninth Circuit,"'
Florida,11 ' Illinois,12 New Jersey,' 6 and Pennsylvania," ' follow this
rationale. No case has been found that rejects outright the view
that the employer can insure himself against the risk of employee
misconduct if the employer does not participate in the conduct
causing the damage.
Intentional Conduct
The pre-1966 standard liability policies provided insurance cov-
erage for bodily injury "caused by accident." Assault and battery
and other intentional conduct was usually not covered, in part on
110 75 F.2d 58 (8th Cir. 1934). See also Shelby Mut. Ins. Co. v. U.S. Fire
Ins. Co., 12 Mich. App. 145, 162 N.W.2d 676 (1968).
75 F.2d at 60.
11 Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Reichard, 404 F.2d 868 (5th Cir. 1968).113 Dart Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 484 F.2d 1295 (9th Cir. 1973).
This case involved compensatory damages for the tort of libel, and not punitive
damages. However, the Ninth Circuit, applying California law, indirectly applies
the same vicarious liability rationale as is applied in cases involving insurance
coverage for punitive damages.
14 Sterling Ins. Co. v. Hughes, 187 So. 2d 989 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
"aScott v. Instant Parking, Inc., 105 Ill. App. 2d 133, 245 N.E.2d 124
(1969).
"'LoRocco v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 82 N.J. Super. 323, 197 A.2d 591 (1964).
"TEsmond v. Liscia, 209 Pa. Super. 200, 224 A.2d 793 (1966).
MANUFACTURER'S LIABILITY
public policy grounds."" The significant language of the old policy
form was the clause that the insurance did not apply to "injuries,
loss or damage... intentionally caused by the insured." The prob-
lem then revolved around the question whether the insured must
have intended the act or have intended the injury before the ex-
clusion applies. Generally, if the insured intended to injure, there
was no coverage;1" if the insured intended to do the act, but not
to injure, then there was coverage."' For example, a firecracker
is thrown with the intent to frighten, but injury results (coverage
exists) ;1 a bomb set to kill A, but B and C are also killed (no
coverage.).12
In 1966, new standard policy forms were introduced, altering
the "accident" and "intentional" injury clauses of the liability
policies. By replacing the word "accident" with that of "occur-
rence," the new policy attempted to eliminate the ambiguity as
to whether an "accident" must happen "suddenly." Since the new
policy specifies that the loss must be "neither expected nor intended
from the standpoint of the insured," this clause also solves the
problem of whether an "accident" is viewed from the viewpoint
of the insured or of the victim.
There are basic policy reasons, in addition to policy language,
to prohibit insurance coverage for intentional wrongful conduct.
In the first place, the parties should not be permitted to control
118See National Life v. Hannon, 108 So. 575 (Ala. 1926); LoRocco v. New
Jersey Mfrs. Indem. Ins. Co., 82 N.J. Super. 323, 197 A.2d 591 (1964). Messer-
smith v. American Fid. Co., 232 N.Y. 161, 133 N.E. 432 (1921); Wilson v.
Maryland Cas. Co., 377 Pa. 588, 105 A.2d 304 (1954); Heffelfinger v. Schell,
343 Pa. 211, 22 A.2d 693 (1941); Anton v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 117 Vt. 300,
91 A.2d 697 (1952); Annot., 23 A.L.R.2d 1105 (1952).
19See Malanga v. Manufacturers Cas. Ins. Co., 28 N.J. 220, 146 A.2d 105;
Annot., 23 A.L.R.2d 1105 (1952).
120Morrill v. Gallagher, 370 Mich. 578, 122 N.W.2d 687 (1963); Connecti-
cut Indem. Co. v. Nestor, 4 Mich. App. 578, 145 N.W.2d 399 (1966); Baldinger
v. onsol. Ins. Co., 15 App. Div. 2d 526, 222 N.Y.S.2d 736 (1961); Pendergraft
v. Commercial Standard Fire & Marine Co., 342 F.2d 427 (10th Cir. 1965);
Wigginton v. Lumbermens Mut. Gas. Co., 169 So. 2d 170 (La. App. 1964); Great
Am. Ins. Co. v. Ratliff, 242 F. Supp. 983 (E.D. Ark. 1965); Kraus v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 258 F. Supp. 407 (W.D. Pa. 1966), afl'd, 379 F.2d 443 (3d Cir. 1966);
American Ins. Co. v. Saulnier, 242 F. Supp. 257 (D. Conn. 1965); Cloud v.
Shelby Mut. Ins. Co., 248 So. 2d 217 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971); N.W. Elec.
Power Coop. v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 451 S.W.2d 256 (Mo. App. 1969).
121 Morrill v. Gallagher, 370 Mich. 578, 122 N.W.2d 687 (1963).
122 Kraus v. Allstate Ins. Co., 258 F. Supp. 407 (W.D. Pa. 1966), aff'd, 379
F.2d 443 (3d Cir. 1966).
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the risk that is being insured; and, secondly, the punishment and
deterrent effect of punitive damages would be eliminated if cover-
age were permitted in such cases. The public policy reasons become
even more pronounced in prohibiting insurance coverage for in-
tentional, wrongful conduct on the part of a manufacturer of a
product, especially transportation vehicles that have wide public
use. If the management of an aircraft manufacturer believes that
its liability for its intentional acts can always, regardless of their
outrageous, though not criminal, nature be passed off to the com-
pany's insurance carrier, the possibility (although most would
agree an extremely unlikely possibility) arises that there may then
be management decisions made that would not properly balance
acceptable profit objectives with safety considerations. To eliminate
this possibility is the public policy reason behind the general rule.
Wilful Acts-Wanton Acts
Some courts, particularly in the older cases, distinguish between
wilful (not covered)" 3 and wanton (covered)' misconduct, the
former representing a public policy position that "wilful" conduct
is the infliction of "intentional" injury and therefore cannot be
insured against; whereas, "wanton" merely implies the failure to
perform a duty and connotes a reckless disregard of the conse-
quences in not doing so. Since it is not intentional, "wanton" con-
duct can, under some older authority, therefore be insured against.
As far as insurance coverage for punitive damages is concerned,
most of the more recent cases do not dwell on these rather fine
distinctions.
In most states, the "wilful and wanton" conduct required to im-
pose liability under an automobile guest act means something more
than ordinary negligence, but is not conduct indicated by a literal
common law construction of that term. Therefore, absent evidence
of intentional or malicious conduct sufficient to award punitive
damages, insurance coverage for liability under an automobile guest
statute-a compensatory action-is not against public policy. How-
121See Travelers Indem. Co. v. Hood, 110 Ga. App. 855, 140 S.E.2d 68
(1964); Sheehan v. Goriansky, 321 Mass. 200, 72 N.E.2d 538 (1947); Messer-
smith v. American Fid. Co., 232 N.Y. 161, 133 N.E. 432 (1921); Rothman v.
Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co., 134 Ohio St. 241, 16 N.E.2d 417 (1938).
12See Sheehan v. Goriansky, 321 Mass. 200, 72 N.E.2d 538 (1947); Roth-
man v. Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co., 134 Ohio St. 241, 16 N.E.2d 417 (1938).
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ever, if the conduct is more than that required to impose liability
under the statute, i.e., is sufficient to go beyond a compensatory
recovery, then insurance coverage for the additional-or punitive-
recovery, should not be permitted on public policy grounds."u
Because of the judicial confusion that is becoming more and
more apparent in the application of punitive damage theories to
products liability cases, "wilful and wanton" definitions must be
carefully examined, and applied only to those products cases that
otherwise involve issues of intentional, fraudulent, or deceitful con-
duct on the part of a manufacturer.2 ' Although most of the re-
ported decisions on the insurability of punitive damages involve
automobile insurance, the rationale and public policy considera-
tions prohibiting an insurance company from insuring punitive
damages apply with even greater logic and force in products
liability litigation.
When corporate policy-making management does not participate
in the misconduct, authorize the misconduct, or know in advance
that the employee is going to commit an act of such a character
so as to warrant the imposition of punitive damages, there is no
2 See the cases collected from various jurisdictions in Annot., 20 A.L.R.3d
320 (1968).
120 For those who are interested in further investigation of the subject of
punitive damages and insurance coverage, see: Annot., 123 A.L.R. 1115 (1939);
7 J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW & PRACTICE S 4312 (1942, Supp. 1974); Cole,
Can Damages Properly Be Punitive, 6 JOHN MARSHALL L.Q. 477 (1941); Com-
ment, Punitive Damages and Their Possible Application in Automobile Accident
Litigation, 46 VA. L. REV. 1036 (1960); Comment, Factors Affecting Punitive
Damages, 7 MIAMI L.Q. 517 (1953); Comment, Insurer's Liability for Punitive
Damages, 14 Mo. L. REV. 175 (1949); Comment, Damages-Intoxicated Driver
-Punitive Damages, 46 IOWA L. REV. 645 (1961); Duffy, Punitive Damages:
A Doctrine Which Should be Abolished, THE CASE AGAINST PUNITIVE DAMAGES
(Defense Research Institute, Inc., 1969); Fischer, Insurance Coverage and the
Punitive Award in the Automobile Accident Suit, 19 U. PITT. L. REV. 144
(1957); Ghiardi, Should Punitive Damages Be Abolished?-A Statement for the
Affirmative, ABA PROCEEDINGS, Section of Ins., Negl. & Comp. Law (1965);
Haskell, Punitive Damages: Public Policy and the Insurance Policy, 58 ILL. ST.
B. J. 780 (1970); 14 OKLA. L. REV. 220 (1961); Logan, Punitive Damages in
Automobile Cases, INS. L.J. 27 (1961); C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW
OF DAMAGES § 78 (1935); Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, 70
HARV. L. REV. 517 (1957); 40 MICH. L. REV. 128 (1941); H. OLECK, DAMAGES
TO PERSONS AND PROPERTY § 275, at 560 (1957); R. LONG, THE LAW OF LI-
ABILITY INSURANCE § 1.26 at 1-74 & 1-75; T. SEDGEWICK, A TREATISE ON THE
MEASURE OF DAMAGES S 347 et seq. (1912); Walther & Plein, Punitive Damages:
A Critical Analysis, 49 MARQ. L. REV. 369 (1965); Washington, Damages in
Contract at Common Law, 47 LAw Q. REV. 345 (1931); 25 C.J.S. Damages
§ 117 (1966).
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compelling public policy reason to prevent a corporation from
obtaining insurance for this type of risk, thereby transferring that
potential liability exposure to an insurance company. The courts
universally recognize this vicarious liability exception to the gen-
eral rule prohibiting insurance coverage for punitive damages."
However, it is an entirely different matter when a corporation,
directly through its officers and policy-making management per-
sonnel, engages in the type of outrageous and fraudulent miscon-
duct that would warrant a punitive damage award. Indeed, in such
a situation, the purposes of punitive damages in almost all states...
(to punish and deter) would be entirely negated if a corporation
were permitted to pass off its punishment to an insurance company.
Corporate management may be poorly motivated to give utmost
consideration to the disastrous effect unsafe products can have on
the consuming public if the rule were otherwise. Furthermore, if
management is allowed to pass off liability to an insurance com-
pany for punitive damages resulting from their own acts, manage-
ment would, in actuality, be passing off its own punishment to the
consuming public through higher insurance premiums and higher
prices. As a net result, the consuming public (and other manfac-
turers) would be punished for outrageous and fraudulent conduct
of a single corporate management team.
One extreme example illustrates the problem. Suppose a man-
agement team of a corporation, in design conference, decides to
change a product in order to save costs, and thereby be able to
undercut competition by substantial price decreases. At the time,
management knows that the product changes contemplated are
extremely dangerous and will probably kill or injure 10% of the
ultimate consumers who use the product, but nevertheless decide
to make the change. If corporate management is permitted to be-
lieve that an insurance company will pay a punitive damage award
rendered against the corporation resulting from that type of de-
cision, such a result would not only negate the purpose of punitive
damage awards, but also clearly be against the public interest.
Although the foregoing example is extreme, it does illustrate the
problem in the products liability area in determining the proper
management level that will render the wrongful conduct a "cor-
27 See cases cited notes 108-17 supra.
12 8Supra notes 31, 32.
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porate" act, rather than the act of an employee. Insurance cover-
age for a "corporate" act that results in punitive damages should
be violative of public policy as a general rule; whereas, all courts
agree, under the vicarious exception to the general rule, that a
corporation can validly insure the risk of liability of outrageous or
malicious conduct of its non-management employees.'"
It would appear clear that acts committed through decisions of
the Board of Directors should be "corporate" acts. In most states,
officers of a corporation are deemed to hold fiduciary and trustee
relationships;13 and, since a corporation can legally act only through
its officers,"' it would appear logical that wrongful conduct by a
company's officers that results in punitive damages would be a
"corporate" act and not insurable. Below this top management
level, however, lie the myriad problems of defining layers of policy-
making management that are akin to all manufacturing concerns.
In the last analysis, the issue simply revolves around an equitable
solution in the public interest based on the particular facts with
which a court is presented. A rational and equitable balance of
that public interest with a manufacturer's very real financial bur-
dens in today's consumer-oriented society should continue to be
subjects of the utmost scrutiny by the judiciary.
It may be surprising to some that no insurance policy issued
today expressly excludes coverage for punitive damages, whether
resulting from "corporate" acts or otherwise. Insurance carriers,
especially in the aviation community, are obviously attempting to
recognize and underwrite very legitimate and serious financial con-
cerns of airlines and aircraft manufacturers. Since competition in
the insurance market does not encourage insurance companies to
expressly exclude punitive damage coverage, the issues of public
policy involved, in whether an insurance carrier should even be
permitted to pay for the civil liability the law imposes to deter
or punish outrageous conduct, deserves much more careful exami-
nation by the bench and bar, particularly in terms of its long range
consequences to the entire aviation community.
12 See cases cited notes 108-17 supra.
1
30 See Voorhees v. Mason, 245 111. 256, 81 N.E. 1056 (1910).
"'See Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911).
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CONCLUSION
Compared with the ordinary product liability case, aviation acci-
dents are more spectacular, and the resulting damage to person
and property is usually more severe, resulting in more substantial
liability exposure. Although aircraft manufacturers sometimes ex-
press their doubts, there are still several basic, and effective, legal
defenses to product liability claims brought against them. Most
obvious is the defense that the aircraft was not defective. It is still
the law that if any defect is found, it must have been the proximate
cause of the accident. The aircraft must have been in the same
condition at the time of the accident as it was when it left the manu-
facturer's control, and was not at that time unreasonably danger-
ous. The aircraft must also have been used in the manner intended
to be used, and with a skill to use that aircraft for its normal and
intended use. The usual legal defenses in aviation negligence cases
are generally the same as those of other types of negligence cases.
"Foreseeability" and "duty" must be distinguished, particularly in
the "crashworthiness" area, and attempted extension of the strict
liability doctrine to design problems involved in aircraft litigation
should be constantly resisted.
All of these basic defenses may seem logical and are well known
by all lawyers involved in product liability litigation, but the real
problem to the aircraft manufacturer lies in a sometimes illogical
application of the rules and an extension of some theories to satisfy
an immediate social demand without there having been sufficient
consideration given to longer-term considerations in the interests of
both the consumer and the manufacturer. In defending aircraft
manufacturers, defense counsel will have to continue to employ
imaginative arguments to resist the flood of innovative ideas being
advanced today to satisfy only one segment of the aviation com-
munity.
With the increasingly greater financial burdens being placed
today upon both commercial and general aviation manufacturers,
they and their insurance carriers are beginning to search for other
methods of compensating product-induced injuries. Such a pro-
posal was made in mid-1973 in an article appearing in Aero Maga-
zine." The author expressed the current problem in this fashion:
132 (June/July 1973).
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A serious disequilibrium has been developing in products liability
law to the point where the continued existence of general aviation
manufacturers could be threatened, new product design is discour-
aged, and users of general aviation aircraft foot mounting bills for
astronomical and often unjustified damage awards. Underlying
this disequilibrium is the tendency of the judicial system in aviation
cases to overlook evidence of pilot error, and accept unconvincing
evidence of product defect, so as to cause manufacturers to com-
pensate those who have suffered the consequences of an airplane
accident."n
In suggesting that product liability decisions handed down in re-
cent years are the beginnings of a national accident insurance sys-
tem, the author proposes that the adversary right of action against
an aircraft manufacturer be eliminated, and substituted with in-
surance to be funded by a direct tax on manufacturers and addi-
tional fuel taxes and licensing fees on general aircraft users-a
cost that, according to the author, would be more than offset by
reductions in individual accident insurance premiums and lower
new airplane prices."M
The hue and cry being raised with greater frequency by insur-
ance carriers and their manufacturing insureds is reminiscent of
that raised 10 or 15 years ago by those in automobile claims field.
Now is the time for a much more realistic appraisal by the courts
of the problems facing the manufacturers of aircraft. Now is the
time to pause and reflect a bit on the long term consequences of
some of the decisions already handed down. Judicial restraint at
this juncture is essential if an equitable balance between the con-
sumer and manufacturer is still deemed important for technologi-
cal progress. The ever-increasing-and disproportionate-financial
burdens which today face aircraft manufacturers in products litiga-
tion raises the real specter of yet another change in our historical
adversary system of compensating product-induced injuries.
"'Quoted in LEGAL EAGLE NEWS (June 1973).
184 Similar proposals are being advanced in medical malpractice cases. See,
Dornette, Medical Injury Insurance-A Possible Remedy for the Malpractice
Problem, 78 CASE & COM., 25 (Sept.-Oct. 1973). See also O'Connell, Expanding
No-Fault Beyond Auto Insurance. 37 THE NATONAL UNDERWRITER (1973) (a
precis of an article to appear in an issue of the University of Virginia Law Review,
which calls for "no fault" application to all kinds of accidents).
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